In a recent article under the above title (but without the question mark) Henry Stapp presented arguments which lead him to conclude that under suitable conditions "the truth of a statement that refers only to phenomena confined to an earlier time" must "depend on which measurement an experimenter freely chooses to perform at a later time." I point out that the reasoning leading to this conclusion relies on an essential ambiguity regarding the meaning of the expression "statement that refers only to phenomena confined to an earlier time" when such a statement contains counterfactual conditionals. As a result the argumentation does not justify the conclusion that there can be frames of reference in which future choices can affect present facts. But it does provide an instructive and interestingly different opportunity to illustrate a central point of Bohr's reply to Einstein, Podolsky, and Rosen.
I. Introduction.

Henry Stapp
1 has subjected the strange quantum correlations discovered by Lucien Hardy 2 to a cunning logical analysis. In a series of fourteen propositions, each of which appeals only to the predictions of quantum mechanics, formal logical transformations, or one of three locality conditions, Stapp reaches a contradiction leading him to reject at least one of the locality conditions and conclude that "the general causal principle that the present facts are independent of free choices to be made at later times" cannot hold in all Lorentz frames.
Many of Stapp's propositions contain counterfactual conditionals -statements about the outcome of experiments that might have been performed but were not. Such constructions, Stapp emphasizes, are permissible provided they do nothing more than state the consequences, for experiments that might have been performed but were not, of the application of a specified set of theoretical assumptions to the actual outcome of an actual 1 Henry P. Stapp, "Nonlocal character of quantum theory," Am. J. Phys. 65, 300-304 (1997) .
2 Lucien Hardy, "Quantum mechanics, local realistic theories, and Lorentz invariant realistic theories," Phys. Rev. Lett. 68, 2981 Lett. 68, -2984 Lett. 68, (1992 . experiment. As Stapp notes, counterfactual statements of this kind are "endemic in science" and the wholesale rejection of all arguments containing such statements "is not rational".
Statements of this general kind are commonplace in physics: Theory often allows one to deduce from the outcome of certain measurements on a system what the outcome of some alternative possible measurements would necessarily be.
The role of counterfactuals in his argument, then, is this:
[T]heoretical assumptions often allow one to say with certainty, on the basis of the outcome of a certain experiment, what "would have happened" if an alternative possible apparatus had been used. If logical arguments of this kind -that follow directly from certain theoretical assumptions -lead to a contradiction, then one must, if rational, accept the fact that at least one of the explicit or implicit theoretical assumptions is incorrect.
The theoretical assumptions to be tested in this way are the validity of the quantitative predictions of quantum mechanics, Lorentz invariance, and certain specific conditions of locality. Contingent on the validity of quantum mechanics, a contradiction would exclude Lorentz invariance or locality.
Keeping in mind Stapp's clear, convincing, and explicit characterization of the proper role for counterfactual conditionals in physical reasoning, in Section III I point out an essential ambiguity in the notion of "present facts" used to justify the step from the fifth to the sixth of his fourteen propositions, that undermines the soundness of his conclusion.
Readers familiar with Stapp's argument can go directly to Section III. Others may want to look at Section II, where I provide the background necessary for the point I wish to make. In Section IV I indicate how the nature of this hidden gap in Stapp Stapp's analysis of the data in the Hardy experiment is so cleverly constructed, so economically stated, and so formally expressed, that it takes (or, more accurately, it took me) a major effort to follow it. Those who make the effort will be rewarded by the beautiful artistry of the construction. Because, however, the disabling ambiguity I wish to identify occurs early in the argument, and because I am primarily interested here in the light it sheds on Bohr's reply to EPR, I give here a statement of the Hardy experiment (in Stapp's notation) that ought to permit a reader to follow the subsequent discussion of that ambiguity (Section III) and its relation to Bohr's reply to EPR (Section IV), without having to master the subtleties of Stapp's full argument or the earlier papers of Hardy.
Hardy's experiment is of the EPR type: two correlated particles fly apart to two experimental stations on the left (L) and right (R). At each station a property independent of their orbital degrees of freedom (e.g. spin or polarization) is subject to one of two alternative measurements (L1 or L2 on the left, and R1 or R2 on the right), each with two possible outcomes (+ or −). The correlations in the outcomes of the four possible pairs of measurements are encapsulated in the two-particle state, given (to within a normalization constant) by
Here a state such as |L1+, R1− indicates a simultaneous eigenstate of the commuting observables L1 and R1 with eigenvalue + on the left and − on the right.
Note that the state |Ψ has been constructed to be orthogonal to the state |L2−, R2+ :
Furthermore each of the two terms in (1) is easily seen to be orthogonal to either of the states |L1−, R2− or |L2+, R1+ :
Finally, because the observables 1 and 2 are non-trivially different on both left and right, |Ψ is not orthogonal to |L1−, R1+ :
The implications of (2), (3), and (4) (5) is that 11-+ can occur. Putting this in terms of joint probabilities,
These four probabilities are the only features of the Hardy state needed for an understanding of what follows. The consequences of (6)- (9) that Stapp requires for his analysis are these:
If experiment 1 is performed on the left and the outcome is − then if experiment 2 is performed on the right the outcome must be + [required by (6)].
If experiment 2 is performed on the right and the outcome is + then if experiment 2 is performed on the left the outcome must be + [required by (7)].
If experiment 2 is performed on the left and the outcome is + then if experiment 1 is performed on the right the outcome must be − [required by (8)].
If experiment 1 is performed on the left and the outcome is − then if experiment 1 is performed on the right the outcome may be + [allowed by (9)]
For ease in referring back to them I summarize these four assertions (listing the compact summaries in the same order) by:
Note that a superficial glance the first three of the four assertions suggest that since L1+ implies R2+, R2+ implies L2+, and L2+ implies R1−, simple logic requires that L1+ implies R1−, which contradicts the fourth. This, of course, is wrong, for these are assertions about the outcomes of four different possible experiments (12, 22, 21, and 22) only one of which can actually be done. At most one of them can be valid. It is nonsense to reason in this way from all four at once, and Stapp does not do this.
What he does try to do, interestingly, is to set this crude intuition in a context that allows the logic suggested by the superficial glance to operate legitimately, even though only one of the four experiments can actually be done on any given pair of particles. He gains the necessary freedom to maneuver by considering the case in which the decisions of which measurement to make on both left and right, along with the performance and recording of the outcomes of those measurements, are confined to space-like separated regions of space-time. Lorentz invariance then requires that any facts, valid in a frame of reference in which the choice and outcome of an experiment on one side happens before the choice and outcome on the other side, must have a valid formulation in a frame in which the time order is reversed. The goal of this strategy is to reduce all statements about the measurements that might have been made but were not, to deductions that exploit the general principle (locality) that decisions about which measurement to make on one side, cannot alter the factual status of an earlier choice, performance, and outcome of a measurement on the other side. If one could achieve this goal, then the resulting contradiction would justify Stapp's claim, cited above, about present facts depending on future choices.
III. What's wrong
Because the choice, performance, and outcome of the measurement on one side can be regarded as taking place either before or after the space-like-separated choice, performance, and outcome of the measurement on the other side, all statements about any of these events must have a valid formulation from either point of view, or in frame-independent atemporal terms. For example the feature summarized by (10) can be stated atemporally as
If 1 is measured on the left with the result − then if 2 is measured on the right the result must be +.
Or it can be stated as
If 1 was measured on the left with the result − then if 2 is subsequently measured on the right the result must be +.
Or it can be stated as If 1 is measured on the left with the result − then if 2 was earlier measured on the right the result must have been +.
Bearing this in mind, consider Stapp's fifth proposition, which translated out of his formal notation into everyday language states (in atemporal terms) that (I) Whenever the choice of measurement on the left is L2, if the measurement on the right is R2 and gives +, then if R1 were instead performed the result would be −.
(The "were" here is the "were" of the present subjunctive -not the past indicative.) The validity of this is established by translating it into the language appropriate to the frame of reference in which the events on the left happen first:
(I L ) Whenever the choice of measurement on the left was L2, if the measurement done later on the right is R2 and gives +, then if R1 were instead done later on the right, the result would have to be −.
To see that (I L ) is correct, note that it states that L2 was performed on the left, but does not specify the outcome. If subsequently R2 is performed on the right and gives +, this enables us to deduce from (11) that the result of the earlier measurement L2 must have been +. This in turn enables us to deduce from (12) that if the choice at R had been to measure 1, the result would certainly have been −.
The use here of a counterfactual conditional is entirely in accord with Stapp's criterion for its legitimacy. It is based on the outcome of an actual experiment (the measurement of L2 on the left with the outcome +) and a theoretical assumption (the validity of the quantum mechanical calculation that the joint probability of L2+ and R1− in the Hardy state is zero.)
Note next that Lorentz invariance requires (I) to be valid when stated in a language appropriate to a frame in which the events on the right happen first:
(I R ) Whenever the choice of measurement on the left is L2, if the measurement done earlier on the right was R2 and gave +, then if R1 had instead been done earlier on the right, the result would necessarily have been −.
The only thing preventing one from establishing (I R ) directly by essentially the same argument that established (I L ), is the objection that there are no compelling grounds for assuming that the result of the later experiment on the left in the hypothetical case (R1 performed earlier on the right) should be the same as the actual result in the actual case (R2 performed earlier on the right). This objection is blocked, however, by the fact that it makes no sense in the frame in which the experiment on the left happens first, and that the recorded result of an actual experiment is a Lorentz invariant piece of information.
Now comes the crucial step to Stapp's sixth proposition [called here (II)]. That proposition is the same as the fifth [(I) above] except that L2 has been changed to L1:
(II) Whenever the choice of measurement on the left is L1, if the measurement on the right is R2 and gives +, then if R1 were instead performed the result would be −.
If we can legitimately get to (II), then the rest is almost a mopping up operation. Informally, suppose the result of that L1 measurement happens to be − (which (9) ensures has a non-zero probability). Then (10) guarantees that the result of the measurement of R2 on the right must be +, and (II) then tells us that if R1 were instead performed on the right the result would be −. The desired contradiction comes from (13), which tells us that the result L1− need not necessarily be accompanied by R1−. There is, to be sure, some tricky terrain to traverse in making these further informal steps airtight, but Stapp brings considerable ingenuity to bear on that task. I do not explore here whether there are further pitfalls, because the move from (I) to (II) is already unsupportable, and for interesting reasons.
Stapp's justification for the move from (I) to (II) is based on viewing (I) in the language of the frame in which the events on the right happen first -i.e. taking (I) in the form (I R ) given above. Consider now the phrase appearing in (I R ), (S) if the measurement done earlier on the right was R2 and gave +, then if R1 had instead been done earlier on the right, the result would necessarily have been −.
Stapp asserts that this refers only to the state of affairs on the right at times prior to the choice of what measurement to make on the left. Since everything of interest on the right takes place before the choice and execution of the experiment on the left, and since "the truth of a statement that refers only to phenomena confined to an earlier time cannot depend upon which measurement an experimenter will freely choose to perform at a later time", it is permissible to replace L2 with L1.
The problem with this justification for the replacement of L2 with L1 is that it goes beyond Stapp's criterion for the proper use of counterfactual conditionals. The first part of (S), (S 1 ) R2 was performed earlier and gave +, does refer to an actual event on the right prior to the choice of experiment on the left, and it does indeed make no sense to claim that its meaning or validity depends on that subsequent choice. But the rest of the statement (S), (S 2 ) if R1 had been performed earlier instead it would have given −, is quite another matter. This is a counterfactual conditional. Unlike the meaning and validity of (S 1 ), the meaning and validity of (S 2 ) do not derive directly from an actual performance of R1 giving the actual result −. As a counterfactual conditional it only has meaning as an inference from actual results of actual experiments in combination with theoretical principles. One piece of information going into that inference is what actually happened on the right (R2 was performed and gave the result +). So far so good. But the other fact, required to make that inference, is that the subsequent choice of experiment on the left turns out, in fact, to be L2. You cannot make the inference asserted by the counterfactual conditional if the subsequent choice of experiment on the left turns out to be L1. A statement about the outcome of an experiment at a given time that might have been performed but in fact was not, may derive its truth or falsity and, indeed, its very meaning from events in the future that have not yet happened. The statement (S 2 ) and hence the full statement (S) implicitly does refer to a choice taking place on the left at the later time.
Overlooking this difficulty in the passage from (I) to (II), Stapp takes his additional steps to the final contradiction, and concludes that at least in some frames of reference the truth of a statement referring only to phenomena confined to an earlier time can depend on which measurement an experimenter freely chooses to perform at a later time. This does not mean, however, that a choice made in the future (whether to measure L1 or L2
on the left) can influence events in the present. What it does mean is that a choice made in the future can influence statements about events in the present that might have happened but did not. It is this that prohibits the step from ( It is true that in the measurements under consideration any direct mechanical interaction of the system and the measuring agencies is excluded, but a closer examination reveals that the procedure of measurements has an essential influence on the conditions on which the very definition of the physical quantities in question rests. tual statements a requirement that they derive their meaning solely from conditions at or prior to the time to which they refer, we see that Stapp's argumentation does not justify his conclusion that "phenomena confined to an earlier time" can in some Lorentz frame depend upon which measurement an experimenter will freely choose to perform at a later time.
The illustration of Bohr's remark through Stapp's argument makes clear that in denying the existence of a "mechanical disturbance" while maintaining the existence of an "influence" Bohr is in no way asserting the presence of a mysterious non-mechanical disturbance ("quantum nonlocality"). In Stapp's analysis of the Hardy experiment, the influence of the choice of what to measure on the left only is only an influence on whether or not a counterfactual statement about events happening entirely on the right has any meaning.
Stapp's argument does not demonstrate nonlocality because that choice of what to measure on the left alters no thing on the right -i.e. it is "not a mechanical disturbance."
What it does alter is what we can meaningfully say about events on the right -i.e. it is an influence on the conditions that permit us to make a meaningful counterfactual statement.
In those that our present actions prevent us from being able to make -we are tempted, with Einstein, Podolsky, and Rosen, to view as statements about elements of reality.
In Stapp's case a different choice of what to measure on one side has an influence on the very conditions which define the possible types of valid counterfactual statements regarding the past behavior of the system. In the EPR case a different choice of what to measure on one side has "an influence on the very conditions which define the possible types of predictions regarding the future behavior of the system" on the other side. In both cases the influence is not on a far away actual state of affairs, but on our ability to make valid statements about that far away state of affairs. A counterfactual is validated by two things: a past event (the actual measurement whose result is required to confirm the counterfactual) and the right future choice of measurement (that makes possible the theoretical deduction). A prediction is validated by two things: a future event (the actual measurement whose result is required to confirm the prediction) and the right past choice (that makes possible the prediction).
By bringing us full circle from Bell and Hardy all the way back to EPR and Bohr, but with an interesting twist, Stapp has provided us with a wonderful opportunity to understand better and to savour more fully, the extraordinary content of that profoundly subtle exchange.
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